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Abstract
An IT risk assessment must deliver the best possible quality of results in a time-effective way.
Organisations are used to customise the general-purpose standard risk assessment methods in a way
that can satisfy their requirements. In this paper we present the QualTD Model and method, which is
meant to be employed together with standard risk assessment methods for the qualitative assessment
of availability risks of IT architectures, or parts of them. The QualTD Model is based on our previous
quantitative model, but geared to industrial practice since it does not require quantitative data which
is often too costly to acquire. We validate the model and method in a real-world case by performing
a risk assessment on the authentication and authorisation system of a large multinational company
and by evaluating the results w.r.t. the goals of the stakeholders of the system. We also perform a
review of the most popular standard risk assessment methods and an analysis of which one can be
actually integrated with our QualTD Model.
1 Introduction
An IT Risk Assessment (RA) must deliver the best possible quality of results in a time-effective way.
Standard methods for RA provide useful general guidelines for organisations to build a robust and
complete Information Security Management System (ISMS) [16], but they often lack implementation
details, due to the fact that they need to be as generally applicable as possible. For this reason
organisations usually develop their own, customised, RA method by merging and implementing a set
of standard methods in a way that fits their requirements.
The problem addressed in this paper was presented to us by a large multinational company and
it regards the method the company uses to assess availability risks. While it is satisfied with the fact
that using the present RA method they can perform RA in time, the company aims at improving
the result quality of their RAs by: (a) assessing availability risks more precisely, and (b) reducing
the level of subjectivity and uncertainty involved in the evaluation of availability risks (i.e., when
determining the impact level of a threat). At the same time, the company wants to keep the method
feasible in terms of both the amount and the detail level of the information required, and of the
time and resources needed to carry out an RA. In other words, any improvement of their current
RA method, resulting from our activity, should not require information that the team carrying out
the RA can not obtain, and should ensure that the results of the RA can still be delivered on time
to the requester.
The natural choice to achieve the company’s goals is to decompose the risk in elementary data
such that: (a) the decomposition is objective, i.e., has a true relationship with the complex risk to be
assessed and (b) the elementary data can be collected cost-effectively and are objective. Architecture-
based RA methods usually fit requirement (a), but there is no proof that they will fit requirement
(b) in this particular case.
In this paper we introduce the Qualitative Time Dependency (QualTD) Model and we show how
we applied it to the industrial case. The QualTD Model is based on our previous quantitative Time
Dependency (TD) Model [27], but geared to industrial practice since it does not require quantitative
data which is often too costly to acquire in this context. The QualTD Model allows one to qualita-
tively assess availability risks by taking into account the dependencies among the constituents of an
IT infrastructure.
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Te evaluate the performance of the QualTD Model in a real-world case, and its applicability to
other cases:
1. We carry out an assessment of the availability risks on the global identity and authentication
management system of the company using the QualTD Model to assess the impact of the
threats and vulnerabilities present in the system.
2. We compare the results obtained with our method with the ones coming from a previous
assessment carried out by the company using their internal RA method.
3. Based on the results of point (2) we identify some general factors that justify the adoption of
our model also in other cases.
4. We indicate how to generalise the approach we followed in the present case to other assessments,
carried out following other popular (standard) RA methods.
5. We provide a brief review of the RM techniques based on dependency graphs which we found
in the literature, and we discuss the results they deliver and their applicability to the present
RA case.
Our results indicate that:
1. The QualTD Model satisfies requirement b), i.e., it is feasible to embed the QualTD Model in
the company’s RA methodology without requiring too much time or unavailable information.
In Section 5 we describe the process of building the model, the steps needed and by estimating
the required time.
2. The QualTD Model satisfies requirement a), i.e., the QualTD method delivers better results
in terms of accuracy and reduces the number of subjective decisions. In Section 6 we analyse
the differences in the results delivered by the two approaches. We also show that the QualTD
method reduces the number of subjective decisions the risk assessor has to take, thus making
the RA more inter-subjective.
3. Other methods do not satisfy requirement b), i.e., they could not be applied to the present
case, due to the fact that they require information that is unavailable or that requires too much
time to be extracted (see Section 9).
4. The QualTD Model can be used in combination with other existing standard methods, under
some conditions, which include (a) the information available is enough to apply the QualTD
Model and (b) the compatibility of the target method with some key features of the QualTD
Model. We show this in Section 8.
This work can be seen as a general validation of the feasibility and the usefulness of the QualTD
Model.
2 The industrial context
The organisation We carried out the case study at a large multinational company with a global
presence in over 50 countries (from now on we call it the Company) counting between 100.000 and
200.000 employees. The Company IT unit supports the business of hundreds of internal departments
by offering thousands of applications accessed by approximately 100.000 employee workstations and
by many hundreds of business partners. The IT facilities for the European branch are located at one
site: our RA was conducted at that site. IT services are planned, designed, developed and managed
at the Company’s headquarters; those services, such as e-mail or ERP systems, are part of the IT
infrastructure which is used by all the different Company’s branches all over Europe.
The stakeholders of the IT service are: (1) the Company’s Global IT Infrastructure (GIT) man-
agement department, (2) the Risk Management and Compliance (RMC) department, (3) users: the
Company’s units using IT services (including GIT and RMC) and (4) an outsourcing company man-
aging parts of the IT infrastructure on behalf of GIT.
GIT provides basic IT infrastructure services such as desktop management, e-mail and identity
management. IT services are designed internally by GIT and then partly outsourced for implemen-
tation and management to another company. The outsourced tasks include specialised coding, server
management, help-desk and problem solving services.
RMC supports the compliance to internal policies and best practices of the Company IT services;
part of the tasks of RMC is to perform on-demand security RAs for the IT services of GIT. An RA
is usually requested by the owner of the IT service each time a new service is developed or a new
release of an existing one is about to be deployed.
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The other business units of the Company rely on IT services for the continuity of their business.
Some of these IT services are developed and managed by the business unit itself (e.g., if they are
specific to the competence area of the unit), while global company services (e.g., authentication,
e-mail system) are provided by GIT. For efficiency reasons, like in most other large organisations,
business units exchange services by means of a “enterprise internal market”: one business unit pays
another one for the use of a given service and the service provider unit finances its activities by
means of these funds. This mechanism increases the efficiency of internal service management.
The implementation and the management of some IT services are outsourced to another company,
which we call the Service Provider. Although the servers running the IT services are owned by
the Company and physically kept within its data centers, the Service Provider manages the OS
and the software running on them. Moreover, for some services, the Company outsources also the
development (e.g., coding, deployment) of the custom applications to the Service Provider. The
Service Provider has signed contracts with the Company which include Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) regarding both the security of the information managed by the outsourcing company and the
availability of the outsourced services.
The target of assessment The system on which we focus our case study is called Oxygen.
Oxygen is the global Identity Management for employees and sub-contractors of the Company. The
goals of the system are:
1. Identity Management : to provide enterprise-wide standard identities for all employees and
contractors of the Company, integrate identities with the different identity authoritative sources
(e.g., the Human Resources information system) and manage them through a governed process
and ensure regulatory and privacy compliance.
2. Identity/Account Linking and data synchronisation: to provide a holistic view of the many
accounts possessed by a person, enforce account termination when a person leaves the Company,
enable data synchronization among identity provider and identity consuming systems for data
accuracy and provide credential mapping, a foundation for Single Sign-On.
3. Identity Service for authentication and authorisation: to provide operational directory services
for general applications to be used for authentication and authorisation, provide the unique,
standard, organisation-wide identifiers for employees and contractors and provide a foundation
for advanced authentication and authorization in the future.
Oxygen is designed and implemented by the GIT department, while the management of the
servers running it is outsourced to the Service Provider.
Figure 1: An overview of the Oxygen architecture
Figure 1 depicts the design of Oxygen: the system is composed of a number of identity stores,
which are identity databases implemented by means of directory services. The main Identity Store
keeps information about all of the identities and their attributes. The Operational and the Application-
specific stores contain a (partial) replica of this information and are accessed by the different appli-
cations which require identities for authentication and identification. Replication of the identities
stores is required for performance reasons.
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Oxygen collects identity data from different authoritative sources, such as the information system
of the Human Resources department. Data acquisition is performed by means of drivers, which also
take care of synchronising data between the different identity stores.
In addition to the identity stores, Oxygen exports also a service portal, which allows employees
of the Company to manage part of their identity record (e.g., updating their home address, changing
password).
The existing RA methodology In 2008, the RMC department carried out an RA on the
Oxygen system following its internal RA process, which is mainly based on the guidelines provided
by BS7799-3 [5], while the official security control policy is compliant with the ISO 27002 [17]
standard.
Figure 2: The internal RA process
Figure 2 depicts the process followed by RMC, which is composed of 6 steps:
1. RA intake: During this step the RA team (composed of people people from the RMC depart-
ment) and the requester project responsible agree on the scope of the RA and the Target of
Assessment (ToA). The requester also submits proper documentation about the IT service to
the RA team.
2. Business Impact Analysis (BIA): during this step the RA team, together with the owner of
the ToA, determines the desired levels of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability for the ToA
(e.g., HIGH integrity and availability and LOW confidentiality). They do this by analyzing the
impact that a breach of one of the three security properties on the information managed by the
ToA would have on the business unit in a realistic worst-case scenario. They also determine
which requirements the ToA has with respect to different legislations and regulations concerning
information security (e.g., SOX compliance).
3. Threat/Vulnerability Assessment (TVA): during this step the RA team analyses the ToA and
determines which threats/vulnerabilities the ToA is exposed to. Risk identification is based
on a fixed list of threats/vulnerabilities which has been derived from a number of existing RA
standards (e.g., BS7799-3, ISO 17799, BSI IT-Grundshuts [5, 15, 36]) and customised to fit the
needs of the Company. Based on the IT security expertise of the RA team each threat is given
a qualitative estimate of likelihood and impact. The BIA influences the TVA in the sense that
the threat list is customised according to the required levels of confidentiality, integrity and
availability of the ToA: the higher the security level, the more detailed the list.
4. Risk prioritisation: risk prioritisation is based on the evaluation of likelihood and impact of the
threats/vulnerabilities. Risk is evaluated as a combination of likelihood (which also includes
vulnerability likelihood) and impact. Threats and vulnerabilities are then prioritised based on
their risk level: the higher the risk, the higher the priority for controls.
5. Proposal of Controls: in this step the RA team proposes a plan to cope with the identified
risks, and identifies controls to mitigate the likelihood of the threats or to protect the ToA
from the identified vulnerabilities. Examples of proposed controls include password policies,
authentication mechanisms or Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems.
6. Documentation and reporting : during this step the RA team presents the results of the RA to
the requester. It is not mandatory for the requester to communicate with the RA team about
follow-up actions taken as a consequence of the RA.
The average time for an RA is approximately three weeks, depending on the size of the ToA (usually,
RMC carries out RAs on ToAs which are comparable in size with Oxygen.) Roughly, the first week
is spent on steps 1 and 2 and for reading all the relevant documentation, another week is spent in
steps 3 and 4, and the remaining week is spent in step 5 and to prepare the final report to be exposed
during step 6. The RA team consists of two people performing the same task independently and
then peer-rewiewing each other’s findings to come to a more objective final result.
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The RA team uses three main sources of information: (a) documentation provided by the re-
quester, (b) interviews with the requester and (c) vulnerability scans and other forms of direct
investigation of security weaknesses.
Documentation includes results from previous assessments (i.e., RAs and security auditing activ-
ities), all the design and develop documents (i.e., functional specifications, security design, technical
infrastructure design and software design) and SLAs and outsourcing contracts.
Interviews with the requester are performed after reading the documentation to clarify doubts
and to set the boundaries of the RA. Another interview is performed for the BIA and, after step 4
for a preliminary discussion about the main risks identified.
Optionally, the RA includes active forms of investigation of security weakness. The general
principle RMC follows is trust but verify, which means that documentation about security measures
implemented is trusted, but verified in its main aspects by means of, for example, vulnerability
scanners.
3 Case study design
Recall that our goal is to apply the QualTD Model to the assessment of availability risks on the
Oxygen system and to compare the results we obtain with those obtained from the previous RA.
To design our case-study we follow the paradigm proposed by Wieringa et al. in [25, 26] for
technical research. The paradigm says that to evaluate a solution we check the following two claims:
1. solution & context produces effects
2. effects satisfy (to an acceptable extent) stakeholder-motivated criteria
Wieringa et al. observe that each technological solution which is applied in a context produces
some effects on it. The effects may (or may not) contribute to satisfy some goals defined by the
stakeholders of the research context. The evaluation criteria set by the stakeholders must be in a
measurable or comparable form, so that if two different solutions are applied to the same context,
they can be evaluated and compared w.r.t. these criteria. The reasoning scheme can be applied when
a solution is specified but not yet implemented [10] or after a solution is implemented [22].
In our case, the technical solutions to be evaluated are the RAs performed on the Oxygen system:
the first done following the RA methodology of the Company and the second made by integrating
that with the QualTD Model. The context in which we apply these solutions is described in Section 2.
Stakeholders, goals and criteria First, we derive the evaluation criteria according to the
stakeholders, which are the ones we introduced in Section 2. To do this we first list their goals w.r.t.
the Oxygen system, then we extract measurable criteria from the goals of each stakeholder. We
derive the goals by analysing the description of the activities GIT provided us during the interviews;
subsequently we define some criteria to measure those goals. Finally, we validate goals and criteria
by means of interviews with the stakeholders. For the sake of presentation we only report the results
of this activity in the list below. For more details please refer to the work of Wieringa et al. [25].
• RMC
1 The goal Ensure good quality of the RA Service is measured by the quality criterion # of
relevant risks identified during an RA vs. # of non-relevant risks identified during an RA.
2 The goal Make the RA process more efficient is measured by the quality criterion # of
hours employed for an RA by the members of the team.
3 The goal Make the RA process less subjective is measured by the quality criterion # of
subjective decisions/estimates done during an RA.
• GIT
4 The goal Ensure cost/effective mitigation controls and timely mitigation plans is measured
by the quality criterion Cost for managing High/Medium/Low risks.
5 The goal Use global (shared) solutions to solve the same problem in different systems is
measured by the quality criteria # of months to implement controls and # of different
solutions employed to solve the same problem in different systems.
6 The goal Implement controls with the least possible contractual and financial impact is
measured by the quality criterion # of controls with contractual and financial impact.
• Services depending on Oxygen
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7 The goal Have the authentication/identity service for their application available when
needed is measured by the quality criteria # of times authentication was not available
in one month and # of times identity management was not available in one month.
• The Service Provider
8 The goal Manage systems with the least possible effort and by remaining compliant with
SLAs is measured by the quality criteria Euro/resources employed for managing HW/SW
and to guarantee SLAs (including consequences for not fulfilling contractual obligations).
Validation process The criteria in the above list will be used in Section 6 to compare the quality
of the model-based RA method we are about to introduce with the RA method of the Company.
4 The Qualitative Time Dependency (QualTD) Model
We now introduce the model supporting our RA method, which we use in the assessment of the
availability risks for Oxygen. To illustrate the ideas we provide a running example showing how the
QualTD Model can be employed.
The QualTD Model represents the ToA, the incidents that can affect it and the effects of their
propagation on the ToA itself. A QualTD Model also includes the availability threats and the
vulnerabilities which are present on the ToA. The model delivers as output the global impact and
the risk levels of the availability incidents hitting the ToA.
We split the presentation of the model according to the three phases of an RA the model supports:
(1) definition of the ToA, (2) risk identification and (3) risk evaluation. To simplify the exposition we
use the following sets to indicate domains: T is the set of all the time intervals (expressed in minutes),
E is the set of all the possible dependency (edge) types and it is defined as E = {AND,OR}, D is
the set of all the qualitative values expressing duration (e.g., Short, Long), L is the set of all the
qualitative values expressing likelihood (e.g., Likely, Unlikely), C is the set of all the qualitative
values expressing business value/criticality of an asset (e.g., Critical, Unimportant), H is the set of
all the qualitative values expressing business harm (e.g., Severe, Neglectable) and R is the set of
all the qualitative values expressing the risk (e.g., High, Low).
Figure 3 summarises the components of the QualTD Model and the relations among them.
Figure 3: UML Class Diagram of the QualTD Model. Nodes of the dependency graphs are both assets
and services/processes. An incident is a composition of a threat, a vulnerability on a set of assets.
4.1 Definition of the ToA
We model the ToA by means of an AND/OR graph which represents the components of the ToA
and their functional/technical and organisational dependencies.
Definition 4.1 (Dependency graph) A dependency graph is a pair 〈N,E〉 where N is a set
of nodes representing the constituents of the ToA, and E is a set of edges between nodes E ⊆
{〈u, v, dept, st〉 | u, v ∈ N,dept ∈ E and st ∈ T }.
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The nodes N of the graph are the constituents of an IT infrastructure, e.g., IT services, ap-
plications, servers, network components and locations, together with the business processes the
infrastructure supports. Different IT components can be represented by means of a single node in
the graph, according to the abstraction level required by the RA. For example, in a company-wide
assessment we could represent an IT service (i.e., a set of servers and all the applications running
on them) by means of a single node, while for the assessment of a specific IT system we model each
component as an individual node.
An edge from node b to node a indicates that a depends on b. The graph supports both AND
and OR dependencies. In the former case this means that a becomes unavailable when any node it
depends on is disrupted. In the latter case a becomes unavailable when all nodes it depends on are
disrupted. Each edge is also annotated with the survival time (st), which indicates the amount of
time v can continue to operate after u is disrupted.
If a node a has an AND dependency on nodes b and c and an OR dependency with nodes d and
e at the same time, we read this as a having an AND dependency on nodes b, c and x, with d and e
having an OR dependency on node x. At the same way, the survival time of node a w.r.t. nodes d
and e becomes the survival time of node x w.r.t. d and e, and the survival time of node a w.r.t. x is
set to zero. This concept is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Equivalence of a graph with mixed AND and OR dependencies.
Running example - Part 1 The ToA in this example is an IT system providing two IT services
(Service1 and Service2), and implemented by means of three applications (App1, App2 and App3)
running on two different servers (Server1 and Server2). Service1 is implemented by App1 and App2
in such a way that if only one of them is off-line, the service results to be off-line as well. Service2 is
implemented by App2 and App3 in such a way that both applications must be off-line to put off-line the
service. App1 and App2 run on Server1, while App3 runs on Server2. According to this description,
we build the dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉 as follows:
N = {Service1, Service2, App1, App2, App3, Server1, Server2} , and
E = { 〈Server1, App1, AND, 0〉, 〈Server1, App2, AND, 0〉, 〈Server2, App3, AND, 0〉,
〈App1, Service1, AND, 0〉, 〈App2, Service1, AND, 0〉, 〈App2, Service2, OR, 0〉,
〈App3, Service2, OR, 0〉 }.
Figure 5 shows the dependency graph we will use for our running example.
To complete the description of the ToA we include in the model an estimate of the criticality of
the business processes and of the IT services in the perspective of the RA requester.
Definition 4.2 (Process/Service criticality) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, the criti-
cality of a process/service is a mapping criticality : N → C .
criticality is defined only for those nodes which represent IT services or business processes. It
expresses the damage the company suffers if the node becomes unavailable. For example, in a
production company, an IT service supporting a production line, which is a core business function,
has a higher criticality than, e.g., personal e-mail for employees.
Running example - Part 2 According to the business unit which uses the IT system, the criticality
level of Service1 and Service2 is respectively Low and High.
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Figure 5: The dependency graph representing the ToA in our running example.
4.2 Risk identification
After modelling the ToA, we identify the vulnerabilities which are present on it, as well as the threats
which could materialise on it, and compromise its availability.
Definition 4.3 (Threat) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, a threat is a potential cause of an
availability incident, that may result in the disruption of one or more nodes of g. We call T the set
of all the threats to the ToA.
This is a common definition of threat, similar to that given in BS7799-3 [5] and ISO 27001 [16];
moreover, it is fully compatible with the concept of threat the Company has adopted in its internal
RA method.
Running example - Part 3 We identify two threats which can materialise on the ToA: a Power
outage can bring off-line the servers and a Denial of Service (DoS) attack can cause the unavailability
of the applications. Our set of threats is therefore T = {Power outage, DoS}.
Definition 4.4 (Vulnerability) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, and the set of threats T , a
vulnerability is a weakness of a node (or group of nodes) in N that can be exploited by one or more
threats in T . We call V the set of vulnerabilities on the ToA.
Also in this case, our definition of vulnerability is consistent with both the definition given in
RA standards, and with the concept of vulnerability the Company has adopted in its internal RA
method.
Running example - Part 4 We identify two vulnerabilities which can be present on the nodes of
the ToA: Server1 does not have an UPS for power continuity in case of outage; moreover, App2
and App3 may crash after a buffer overflow attack. Our set of vulnerabilities is therefore V =
{No UPS, Buffer overflow}.
We model an availability incident as a specific threat materialising on a particular component of
the IT architecture by exploiting a specific vulnerability.
Definition 4.5 (Incident) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, a set of threats T and a set of
vulnerabilities V , an availability incident i is a 3-uple 〈M, t, v〉 with M ⊆ N , t ∈ T and v ∈ V ,
describing the combination of three events:
1. v is a weakness of each node n ∈M
2. t materialises (simultaneously) on each node n ∈M
3. t exploits v to materialise
We call I the set of all incidents generated from g, T and V . Moreover, we say a node n is directly
affected by an incident i = 〈M, t, v〉 if n ∈M .
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Running example - Part 5 By combining g, T and V we identify four incidents that can hit the
ToA: (i1) A power outage causes Server1 to stop because there is no UPS, (i2) a DoS attack is
performed on App2 by exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability, (i3) a DoS attack is performed
on App3 by exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability, and (i4) a DoS attack is performed both
on App1 and App2 by exploiting the buffer overflow vulnerability. Our set of incidents is therefore
I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} where:
i1 = 〈{Server1}, Power outage, No UPS〉, i2 = 〈{App2}, DoS, Buffer overflow〉,
i3 = 〈{App3}, DoS, Buffer overflow〉, i4 = 〈{App2, App3}, DoS, Buffer overflow〉.
The last concept we introduce for risk identification is incident propagation.
Definition 4.6 (Incident propagation) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉 and an incident
i = 〈M, t, v〉, we say that i can propagate to a node n ∈ N if:
1. n ∈M , or
2. ∃e ∈ E | e = 〈m,n,AND, st〉 and i propagates to m, or
3. ∀e ∈ E | e = 〈m,n,OR, st〉, i propagates to m.
Running example - Part 6 We want to know if the incident i1 = 〈{Server1}, Power outage, No UPS〉
propagates to Service1. Although Service1 is not directly affected by the incident, it depends on App1
and App2, which in turn depend on Server1. Server1 is directly affected by the incident, therefore
we know that i1 will propagate to Service1.
Definition 4.7 (Nodes affected by the propagation of an incident) Given a dependency graph
g = 〈N,E〉 and an incident i = 〈M, t, v〉, Propi = {n ∈ N | i propagates to n}.
Running example - Part 7 According to Definition 4.7, the set of nodes affected by the incident
i1 = 〈{Server1}, Power outage, No UPS〉 is Propi = { Server1, App1, App2, Service1 }.
An availability incident propagates on the IT infrastructure because of the technical/functional
and organisational dependencies that connect the constituents of the infrastructure. For example, a
power outage on a datacenter will result in some servers being unavailable, as well as the applications
running on these servers. This disruption causes the IT services depending on the disrupted appli-
cations to become unavailable in turn, and propagates from servers to the (key) business processes
supported by the IT services.
4.3 Risk evaluation
The last piece of information we include in the model regards likelihood and duration of incidents.
In more detail, an availability threat is characterised by two indicators: (1) the threat likelihood and
(2) the time needed to solve the disruption caused by the threat when it materialises, e.g., a Short
or Long disruption.
Definition 4.8 (Threat likelihood) Given the set of threats T , the threat likelihood is a mapping
t-likelihood : T → L .
Running example - Part 8 Security analysts have assigned a likelihood to the threats in T using
the following scale: Very Likely, Likely and Unlikely. The likelihood of Power outage is Unlikely
and the likelihood of DoS is Likely.
The likelihood of a threat is an estimate of the probability of the threat materialising on the ToA.
Here we have made the (simplifying) assumption that the likelihood of a threat is a property of the
threat itself and it is independent from the asset the threat occurs on. The assumption holds for
most of the threats, but not for targeted attacks (i.e., attacks crafted for and directed to a specific IT
asset), since the likelihood of the attack is influenced by the value of the targeted asset. In this case
we split the threat into a number of new threats, each of them representing a specific asset being
targeted.
It is common practice in qualitative RAs to assess the likelihood of threats by means of so-called
likelihood models. Each model combines different parameters, e.g., difficulty of the attack, resources
needed, etc. to determine the final likelihood of a threat. However, it is out of the scope of this work
to specify such a model; in the literature there exist works proposing models for specific contexts
(e.g., eTVRA [23] for telco networks).
Definition 4.9 (Incident duration) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉 and a set of incidents
I, the incident duration is a mapping dt : I ×N → D .
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dt(i,n) is an estimate of the (average) time a node n is out of service when incident i occurs. If
we consider, for example, a buffer overflow attack freezing an application, the disruption time is the
time needed to detect that the application is no longer running and to restart it. We do not take into
account the time needed to fix the vulnerability exploited by the threat (e.g., the time to patch the
system), unless this activity is needed to restore the functionalities of the system. To keep the model
qualitative, and to match the Company methodology, we apply a discretisation of the disruption
time in terms of short disruption (i.e., shorter than a given threshold) and long disruption (i.e.,
longer than a given threshold), which constitute our D set.
Running example - Part 9 According to the stakeholders of the IT system, an incident is classi-
fied as a Long disruption if it takes more than 3 hours to be repaired, as a Short one otherwise. The
contract signed with the power company guarantees that a power disruption is repaired on average
in 6 hours. Therefore, i1 is classified as a Long disruption. Since restoring App2 or App3 after they
crashed only requires a restart, incidents i2, i3 and i4 are classified as Short disruptions.
We now associate vulnerabilities with their likelihood.
Definition 4.10 (Vulnerability likelihood) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, and the set
of vulnerabilities V , the vulnerability likelihood is a mapping v-likelihood : V × P (N) → L , where
P (N) is the power set of N .
The v-likelihood(v, Nv) is an estimate of the probability that the vulnerability v is present in
the set of homogeneous (i.e., nodes which can suffer from the same vulnerability with the same
likelihood) nodes Nv. The simplest and most frequent case is when we determine the likelihood of
a vulnerability being present on a single node of g. However, we might also need to consider the
likelihood of a vulnerability being present on a set of homogeneous nodes which are involved in a
specific incident. For example, consider the case in which some malware causes a number of servers
to stop working by exploiting a vulnerability which is present in an application deployed on all of
these servers: in this case we need to estimate the likelihood of the vulnerability being present on
all of the servers running the application with the vulnerability, since the resulting incident would
affect all of them at once.
In case of an accurate RA (e.g., when it is possible to do technical vulnerability verification such as
penetration testing), the fact that an application is present on an IT component can be determined
without uncertainty; for example by making sure a buffer overflow affects a web server by trying
to exploit it. However, in most cases, due to lack of time, the RA team has to rely on indirect
(and therefore uncertain) information, for example, by consulting the NIST National Vulnerability
Database [38] to check if the web server may suffer from a specific buffer overflow vulnerability.
v-likelihood is the expression of this uncertainty.
Running example - Part 10 Security analysts have assigned a likelihood to the vulnerabilities in
V using the following scale: Very Likely, Likely and Unlikely. The likelihood of No UPS and
Buffer overflow is Very Likely.
4.4 Output of the QualTD Model
We use the information contained in the model to calculate the risk associated with an incident,
which is influenced by the likelihood that the threat occurs in the ToA (which is a property of the
ToA), the likelihood that a vulnerability is present in a node or a set of nodes (which expresses
the uncertainty about whether or not the vulnerability is present in the nodes) and the estimated
disruption severity. In more detail, an incident causes (by propagation) a disruption with a certain
duration on some nodes of the dependency graph which have a certain criticality. We call this
combination the global impact of the incident.
Intuitively, the more critical the processes/services affected and the longer the disruption, the
greater the impact of the incident will be, i.e., the global impact of an incident is monotone.
Definition 4.11 (Global impact) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, an incident i = 〈M, v, t〉,
a monotone composition function harm : C × D → H mapping criticality and duration to business
harm, and a monotone aggregation function impact-agg : H × ...× H → H ; the global impact of i
is defined by the mapping golbal-impact : I → H , such that:
global-impact(i) = impact-agg
n∈Propi
(harm(criticality(n), dt(i, t))) (1)
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Running example - Part 11 The risk assessment team has decided that the global impact of an
incident is calculated using the following rules:
a) the global impact is Critical if the incident causes the disruption of at least one service with High
criticality;
b) the global impact is Moderate if the incidents causes a Long disruption on any service, or a Short
disruption of at least a service with Medium criticality;
c) the impact is Insignificant otherwise.
For example, if we take the above definition a), the impact-agg function is implemented by the “at
least one service” statement, and the harm function is implemented by associating any disruption of
a service with High criticality to the Critical impact. According to these rules the criticality of i1,
i2, i3 and i4 is respectively: Moderate, Insignificant, Insignificant, Critical.
Now that we have defined the incident global impact we can evaluate the incident risk, which is a
composition of the likelihood of the threat, the likelihood of the vulnerability and the global impact
of the disruption caused by the threat materialising.
Intuitively, this means that the more likely it is that a threat materialises on an asset (or a set of
assets), or the more likely it is that the asset is vulnerable to that threat, and the more harmful the
threat is, the more reasons there will be to protect it against this incident. As for the global impact,
also the incident risk is therefore monotone.
Definition 4.12 (Incident risk) Given an incident i = 〈M, t, v〉, the incident risk is a mono-
tone composition function i-risk : L × L × H → R mapping t-likelihood(t), v-likelihood(v) and
global-impact(i) to the risk level of i.
Running example - Part 12 As for the global impact, the risk assessment team has decided that
the risk level of an incident is calculated using the following rules:
a) the risk level is High if either the incident has a Critical global impact and at least Likely threat
and vulnerability likelihood, or if the global impact is Moderate and threat and vulnerability likelihood
are both Very Likely;
b) the risk level is Medium if either the incident has a Critical global impact and the vulnerability
likelihood is at least Likely, or if the global impact is Moderate and the vulnerability likelihood is at
least Likely;
c) the risk level is Low otherwise.
In this case, i-risk is implemented by means of these three rules, which associate the combination of
global impact, threat likelihood and vulnerability likelihood to the corrispondent risk level. According
to these rules, the risk level of i1, i2, i3 and i4 is respectively: Medium, Low, Low and High.
An additional operation one would like to do is to aggregate the incident risk in terms of threats
and vulnerabilities. Evaluating risk in terms of threats and vulnerabilities is important to determine
both the risk profile of the ToA, i.e., which threat sources are the most harmful, and to prioritise
vulnerabilities to be addressed (i.e., patched) first.
Definition 4.13 (Threat/Vulnerability risk) Given a dependency graph g = 〈N,E〉, a threat
t and the set of incidents It = {i | i = 〈Mt, t, vt〉}, a vulnerability v and the set of incidents
Iv = {i | i = 〈Mv, tv, v〉} and a monotone aggregation function risk-agg : R × ...× R → R ;
the risk of a threat t is an aggregation of the risk level of all the possible incidents which can originate
from that threat (It), i.e., the mapping t-risk : R × ...× R → R such that:
t-risk(t) = risk-aggi∈It(i-risk(i)) (2)
Similarly, the risk of a vulnerability v is the aggregation of the risk level of all the possible incidents
in which that vulnerability has been exploited (Iv), i.e., the mapping v-risk : R × ...× R → R such
that:
v-risk(v) = risk-aggi∈Iv (i-risk(i)) (3)
Running example - Part 13 If we use Max as the aggregation function risk-agg for calculating
threat and vulnerability risk level, we assign each threat/vulnerability the maximum risk level of the
incidents they are involved in. In this way, the risk level of Power outage and DoS is respectively
Medium and High. Accordingly, the risk level of No UPS and Buffer overflow is respectively Medium
and High.
The QualTD Model supports the traceability of the RA results. For instance, suppose the RA has
been carried out, and after some time we want to recall why a DoS is a High risk for our system; we
can go through the records of the model and discover that:
1. it is Likely that a DoS is carried out by exploiting a Buffer overflow on both App2 and App3,
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2. both App2 and App3 are Very Likely to be prone to a Buffer overflow
3. the resulting incident causes a Short disruption of the High critical service Service2,
4. according to points 1–3 and to the impact and risk level definitions, the risk of a DoS in the
system is High.
When doing impact and risk evaluation we use the composition and aggregation functions harm,
impact-agg, i-risk and risk-agg, which operate with qualitative values (e.g., High likelihood and Low
impact): the definition of the composition and aggregation functions is outside the scope of our
model and it is left to the choice of the RA team. However, these functions must be monotone and
semantically sound w.r.t. the meaning that the qualitative values involved have for the stakeholders
of the RA. For example, the definition of Critical impact we give in the running example part
11 is semantically sound; whereas it would not have been sound if we defined as Critical an
incident causing a Short disruption on a service with Low criticality. In the running example and in
Section 5 we describe two possible implementations of harm, impact-agg, i-risk and risk-agg, based
on descriptive tables which define all the possible combinations of input and output values.
5 Availability RA using the QualTD Model
In this section we describe how we employed the QualTD Model in the new RA of Oxygen. Four
steps of the Company internal RA process were affected by the use of the QualTD Model, as we show
in Figure 6. First, we included in the RA Intake the activity of building the dependency graph. We
spent 10 days to perform this task. We also re-performed part of the BIA: instead of only defining the
security requirements for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, we also assessed the criticality
level of the main IT services of the ToA. We spent on this one hour. Finally, we carried out the
Threat Vulnerability Analysis and Risk prioritisation by using the QualTD Model as we explained
in Section 4. We employed 9 days to perform this task.
Figure 6: The internal RA process combined with the QualTD Model. Supported steps are drawn in
black.
To build and run the QualTD Model for Oxygen we relied on two sources of information: technical
documentation and interview sessions. In practice we had at our disposal the same documentation
the RA requester provided for the previous RA, as we describe in Section 2. In more detail, four
documents were made available for the RA:
1. The functional specification document This document describes which are the functionalities
provided by Oxygen and how the functional architecture is designed, i.e., which software com-
ponents are implemented, what is their task and how they relate to each other.
2. The security architecture and design document This document describes which security mea-
sures are implemented, e.g., server redundancy, and how they are implemented, e.g., which
services are redundant and where they are located.
3. The internal SLA document This document describes the quality of service parameters which
are guaranteed to the users of Oxygen. In the context of availability, this document describes
the availability figures for the different services provided by Oxygen, e.g., the authentication
service is guaranteed to be available 99% of the times.
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4. The network diagram This document describes which are the actual servers running the different
components of the Oxygen system, which software they are running and in which datacenter
they are being managed.
We now describe in detail the activities we performed. For the sake of exposition we split the
description according to the tasks that compose the Company RA process. Each task is further split
according to the specific step of the QualTD Model of Section 4.
5.1 RA Intake
Defining the ToA The first step towards the QualTD Model-based RA is building the depen-
dency graph for Oxygen. We modelled five types of nodes in the dependency graph, according to
the indications of the quantitative Time Dependency Model [27], extracting the information about
them from the available documentation. According to the level of abstraction required for this RA,
we modelled the following node types:
1. Datacenters: from the security architecture document and the network diagram we extracted
the two buildings hosting the datacenters in which the servers are split for redundancy purposes.
2. Network components: from the security architecture document and the network diagram we
extracted the firewalls protecting the different servers and enabling access to the Oxygen services
from the internal network.
3. Servers: from the security architecture and the network diagram we extracted which servers
are used.
4. Applications: from the security architecture, the network diagram and the functional specifi-
cation documents we extracted the applications running on each server.
5. IT Services: from the functional specification and the internal SLA document we extracted the
services exported by Oxygen, linking them to the applications implementing them.
The most challenging task in building the dependency graph was to determine the dependencies
among the nodes. The dependencies among buildings, network components, servers and applications
could be inferred from the network diagram and the security architecture. Unfortunately, the func-
tional specification document, which should link software to IT services, only referred to “logical”
software components, which are not directly linked to the servers and the applications running on
them. For instance, the functional component which acquires identity information from the different
authoritative identity sources is actually implemented by three different applications: a Java-based
web service, a Directory service and a DBMS; in turn, the DBMS also supports other functional
components. To determine these dependencies we proceeded by refinement: whenever in the doc-
umentation we found that a certain application runs on a certain server, or that the application
implements a certain service, we drawn a new dependency among these nodes. Then, we cross
checked the information from the functional specification and the network diagram documents to
check if the dependencies we found were consistent throughout all the documents. When we found
an inconsistency, we updated the model and iterated the process. We reached a “stable” version of
the model after the third iteration.
The resulting graph is made of 64 nodes and 112 edges. Among the nodes we count 12 IT services,
32 applications, 14 servers equally distributed between 2 datacenters and connected simultaneously
to 2 different network segments by means of 2 different firewalls. Building the first prototype version
of the graph took us approximately one week, using only the four documents we described as a
source.
After building this prototype version of the dependency graph we checked it with the RMC
personnel during an interview session: we showed the graph and explained the reasons motivating
each dependency drawn; we then asked for possible missing ones. For example, we showed that a
failure in the DBMS would lead to the unavailability of the identity data acquisition service and we
asked if this conclusion was consistent with their knowledge of the system. The answer was positive;
in effects no inconsistencies were found during this session. Finally, we performed another interview
session with the developers of the system to further check for consistency and completeness of the
dependency graph. During this session we focused our explanation of the graph on the reasons
motivating the choice of modelling a dependency between two nodes. For example, we motivated
the choice of drawing a dependency from the DBMS to the application server since the Web Service
uses the DBMS to store configuration parameters, and the unavailability of the DBMS would cause
the Web Service to be unable to operate in turn. We found some discrepancies between our model
and the behaviour of the system which is currently implemented. These discrepancies were due to
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inaccurate or outdated information in the functional specification document: we decided to keep
the graph coherent with the actual implementation of Oxygen, instead of the one present in the
documentation. The previous RA did not spot these discrepancies, as the analysis of the ToA
required to build the dependency graph is much more detailed than the analysis required for an
assessment which does not require to build any formal model.
5.2 Business Impact Analysis
After we built the dependency graph, we proceeded with the Business Impact Analysis (BIA) step,
which consists of determining the required level of availability for the whole Oxygen system and the
criticality level of all the IT services exported by Oxygen. We did this by means of an interview
session with the GIT department board, together with a member of the RMC department.
Since the required level of availability for Oxygen had already been assessed during the previous
RA, we only made sure that that part of the BIA was still valid. The GIT personnel confirmed
that Oxygen requires a High level of availability. We then used this parameter during the risk
identification phase for the selection of the threats and vulnerabilities to be used, as we describe in
Section 5.3.
The next step of the BIA, which is not part of the RA method of the Company consists of
assessing the criticality of the IT services. For each IT service in the dependency graph we asked
the GIT personnel if it had a High, Medium or Low criticality. In this way we defined the criticality
function (see Definition 4.2).
After this last interview we had a final (approved) version of the dependency graph representing
the ToA.
5.3 Threat/Vulnerability Analysis
Risk identification Because of the design of our case study, we did not need to search for new
threats or vulnerabilities: recall that the RMC department adopted a threat/vulnerability list for
their RAs, which was extracted from a number of standard RA methods and customised to fit the
needs of the Company. To be able to compare the results of our RA with the previous one we used
the same threats and vulnerabilities.
The list comprises a total of 121 threats and vulnerabilities. Since we were only interested in
assessing availability risks, we selected a subset of this list: the set T was composed of 22 threats and
the set V of 39 vulnerabilities. The RMC personnel had previously determined for each entry if it has
an impact on confidentiality, integrity or availability: we relied on this labelling and we only select
threats and vulnerabilities with an impact on availability. Moreover, according to the Company
RA method, threats and vulnerabilities are selected based on the required level of Confidentiality,
Integrity or Availability for the ToA: since the level of Availability of Oxygen has not changed in the
two RAs, we are allowed to use the same availability threats and vulnerabilities.
The next step we performed was to link threats with vulnerabilities. During the previous RA,
threats and vulnerabilities were assessed separately, and the RMC personnel had assigned them
a likelihood and impact estimate based on their professional judgement. On the other hand, our
QualTD Model requires us to link threats with vulnerabilities, therefore making explicit the reason-
ing that was implicitly done during the previous assessment. We did this by selecting, for each of the
22 threats, which one of the 39 vulnerabilities the threat can exploit to materialise. We proceeded
as usual for validating our threat-vulnerability mapping, i.e., we explained our choices to the RMC
personnel during an interview session and we integrated our mapping based on their opinion. Al-
though no major inconsistency was found, we had to change a small number of mappings, because
of a misinterpretation of the meaning of some threats.
Subsequently, we determined which nodes of the dependency graph were targeted by threats and
in which nodes a certain vulnerability was present. To do this we evaluated which kind of node the
threat/vulnerability applies to; for example, a power disruption can only affect a datacenter, a DoS
attack can only affect software nodes.
Finally, we enumerated the availability incidents following Definition 4.5. This task was performed
automatically by intersecting threats with the nodes they target, vulnerabilities with the nodes they
are present in and threats with the vulnerabilities they can exploit. We inserted all these information
in a database. Therefore, listing incidents was nothing more than building a view on the existing
table schema. We checked our results with the RMC personnel, to detect inconsistencies in our
decisions. We found no discrepancy, as mapping threats and vulnerabilities to asset types was quite
an unambiguous task.
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Risk evaluation We borrowed from the previous RA the estimate of the likelihood of each threat
and vulnerability, i.e., the definition of the t-likelihood and v-likelihood functions of Definition 4.8 and
Definition 4.10. The estimate was done in terms of High, Medium and Low likelihood level, according
to an evaluation model defined by the RMC personnel and based on eight different parameters (e.g.,
time needed for the attacker, technical skills needed, etc.). The reason why we did not do our own
estimate of the likelihood is twofold: first, we needed to ensure that the results of the two RAs could
be comparable and, since our model only implies a different way in estimating the impact, likelihood
had to be kept fixed. Second, since the results of this second RA are meant to be used by GIT, we
wanted the likelihood estimates to be based on the professional judgement of the RMC personnel,
instead of ours.
To assess incident duration (i.e., the dt function of Definition 4.9) we first set the threshold
between a Short and Long duration by means of the internal SLA document. This document gives an
availability figure for the IT services provided by Oxygen. For example, the identity data acquisition
service will be available with a certain frequency in a month. We set the threshold as the longest
amount of time (in hours) the service can be out of service while remaining compliant with its
SLA. For example, if the availability figure is 99.5% in a month (i.e., 30 days), we set 4 hours as
our threshold. In this way we distinguished between Short incidents (i.e., those shorter than the
maximum tolerated disruption time in a month) and Long ones (i.e., those which last longer than
the maximum tolerated disruption time in a month). Subsequently, we analysed the time needed
to solve each of the incident. We considered both the time needed to detect the disruption and
the time needed to fix the problem. The resulting total disruption time, which we compared with
the threshold, is the sum of these two parameters. We performed this analysis based on both the
information we gained from the SLA document the Company has signed with the outsourcer, and
the opinion of the developers of the Oxygen system. The SLA document contains the maximum
response time for incidents happening in the portions of the system for which management has
been outsourced. For all the remaining parts of the system we relied on the judgement of the GIT
developers.
At this stage we acquired all the information needed to run the model and obtained the global
impact of the incidents and their risk. For each incident i we used the dependency graph to determine
the set Propi of the processes and services which were affected by the incident given the asset the
incident directly targets as we described in Definition 4.7. Subsequently, we used Table 1 to determine
the global impact level. The definitions we used reflect the requirements for availability the GIT
has set on Oxygen during the meeting in which we assessed the criticality of services/processes, and
are an implementation of the combination of the composition function harm and the aggregation
function impact-agg of Definition 4.11.
Table 1: Global impact level determination.
Impact level Definition
Critical
At least one service/process with High criticality is disrupted for
a Long period of time.
Serious
At least one service/process with High criticality is disrupted for
a Short period of time.
Significant
At least one service/process with Medium criticality is disrupted
for a Long period of time.
Moderate
At least one service/process with Medium criticality is disrupted
for a Short period of time.
Marginal
At least one service/process with Low criticality is disrupted for a
Long period of time.
Insignificant
No service/process is disrupted or at least one service/process
with Low criticality is disrupted for a Short period of time.
We then used the definitions of Table 2 to determine the risk level associated with every incident.
The definition of the risk level we give is based on the indications of the RMC personnel and it is an
implementation of the function i-risk of Definition 4.12.
The choice of using these two tables to evaluate the global impact and the risk level was driven
by two main motivations: first, the functions defined by the tables are surjective and monotone,
therefore they are compliant with the requirements of Definition 4.11 and Definition 4.12, and allow
one to trace back the reasons causing the assignment of a certain risk level to a certain incident
(see Running example 13). Secondly, the alternative choice of assigning a numerical value to each
qualitative one (e.g., High = 3, Med = 2 and Low = 1) and then perform mathematical operations on
them (e.g., sum, multiplication or average) would not work in our case. In fact, although this is a
very popular and widely adopted technique in RAs (e.g., see Cunningham et al. [6]), it only provides
meaningful results if we know the exact ratio among the qualitative values (e.g., if we knew that
High is exactly three times Medium we could assign 9 to High and 3 to Medium). Since our RA was
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Table 2: Incident risk level determination.
Risk level Definition
High
Impact is Critical, threat and vulnerability likelihood are at least
Medium. Impact is Serious, threat and vulnerability likelihood are
High.
Med-High
Impact is Serious, threat and vulnerability likelihood are at least
Medium. Impact is Significant, threat and vulnerability likelihood
are High.
Med
Impact is Critical, threat or vulnerability likelihood are at least
Medium. Impact is Serious, threat or vulnerability likelihood are
at least Medium. Impact is Significant, threat and vulnerability
likelihoods are at leastMedium.
Med-Low
Impact is Significant, threat or vulnerability likelihood are at
least Medium. Impact is Moderate, threat and vulnerability likeli-
hood are at least Medium. Impact is Marginal, threat and vulnera-
bility likelihoods areHigh.
Low Impact is Moderate, Marginal or Insignificant.
carried out in a complete qualitative way, we only know that High is bigger than Medium, but we
do not have any indication on how big the ratio is between them, therefore, we cannot perform any
mathematical operation on these values. In other words, we work with values in an Ordinal scale,
while to carry on the other approach we would need at least values in an Interval scale, as shown by
Herrmann [11].
5.4 Risk prioritisation
Having determined the risk level, we ranked availability incidents according to their risk. However, to
complete the outcome of the threat/vulnerability assessment step, we also needed to rank the most
dangerous threats and vulnerabilities for Oxygen. We did this by assigning each threat/vulnerability
the risk of the incident they cause, which has the highest level associated. In other words, we used
max as the aggregation function risk-agg of Definition 4.13.
6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the QualTD Model in two ways. First, we compare the results of the RA
carried out following the Company’s method (from now on RA1) and the one we performed using
the QualTD Model (from now on RA2). To do that we use four evaluation criteria from the list of
Section 3. These parameters are: (1) the number of relevant risks vs. the number of non-relevant
risks identified by the assessment, (2) the number of hours employed to carry out the RA, (3) the
number of subjective decisions that the RMC personnel has to take and (4) the cost of managing
availability risks. The other criteria of the list are not decidable by a risk analyst but would be
observable after the system has been in use for a while. A risk analysis will have an impact on how
the system scores on these criteria but based on our evaluation alone we cannot tell what the impact
of our method will be. Additionally, we benchmark the QualTD Model using the maturity model
provided in the ISACA RiskIT framework for risk management.
In the sequel of this section we will conduct the detailed analysis, but, for the sake of presentation,
we anticipate here the results in a nutshell: (1) the QualTD Model has improved the (perceived)
accuracy of RA2 by increasing the number of relevant risks identied, (2) it introduced an overhead
in the number of hours employed, (3) it helped reducing the subjectivity of RA2 and (4) thanks to
the effects of points (1) and (3), the QualTD Model supports a better risk prioritisation, which is
one of the requirements for optimising the cost of risk mitigation.
Preliminaries In this analysis we assume that, given a method to calculate the risk in an RA,
the quality of an RA is only determined by the knowledge of the risk assessor about: (a) the ToA, (b)
threats and their likelihood, (c) vulnerabilities and their likelihood and (d) how threats, vulnerabili-
ties relate to each other and impact the ToA. We choose not to include all the social/organisational
factors, e.g., the relationships among the stakeholders and their commitment to IT security, the
alignment of all the stakeholders w.r.t. the organisation business goals, etc. These factors are indeed
very important for the success of a RA but, for the sake of this evaluation, we assume them to have
remained steady in the Company throughout the two RAs, and therefore to have no impact. For
more examples of other IT RA social/organisational success factors, please refer to [31, 8].
The experiment we carried out compares the results of two RAs, performed sequentially by
different people on the same IT system. For these reasons, to keep the experiment under control,
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we needed to make sure that: (1) the order in which the RAs were carried out does not influence
their results, and (2) the quality of the results does not depend on the security skills of the people
carrying out the RAs.
To accomplish these conditions we conducted RA2 before having access to the results of RA1,
but using the same sources of information; we used the same list of threats and vulnerabilities, as
well as the same likelihood estimation, in both the RAs and we made sure the method we employed
to build the dependency graph and to relate threats, vulnerabilities and nodes did not depend on
the particular security skills of the risk assessor.
Table 3 summarises the conditions that we respected to ensure the two RAs are comparable.
Table 3: RA comparison control variables
(1) RA Order (2) Security skills
(a) ToA Used the same documentation in the two
RAs. RA2 is blind to the results of RA1
(see Section 5.1).
The technique to build the dependency
graph does not require particular security
skills (see Section 5.1).
(b) Threats & likelihood The same threat list and likelihood esti-
mation was used for RA1 and RA2 with-
out any change (see Section 5.3).
Only the security skills of the RMC team
have been employed in the two RAs for
threat identification and likelihood esti-
mation (see Section 5.3).
(c) Vulnerabilities &
likelihood
The same vulnerability list and likelihood
estimation was used for RA1 and RA2
without any change (see Section 5.3).
Only the security skills of the RMC team
have been employed in the two RAs for
vulnerability identification and likelihood
estimation (see Section 5.3).
(d) Combining threats,
vulnerabilities and
nodes
RA2 does not use any information of
RA1 about this (see Section 5.3).
The technique to combine threats, vul-
nerabilities and nodes does not depend
on particular security skills (see Sec-
tion 5.3).
Criterion 1: # of relevant risks vs. # of non-relevant risks identified The first
evaluation criterion is given by the number of identified relevant risks w.r.t. the non-relevant ones
and it expresses the result quality of an RA method. To determine the performance in identifying
relevant risks of RA2 w.r.t. RA1, we compared and analysed the results of the two RAs together
with the RMC personnel.
First, we made sure that risks were evaluated following the same criteria in both RAs, i.e., given
the same threat and vulnerability likelihood and impact levels, the resulting risk level is the same.
Secondly, we analysed the cases in which the two RAs gave different results, by analysng the reasons
of the difference. Table 4 summarises our findings.
Table 4: Summary of the number of differences between the two RAs.
Threats Vulnerabilities Total
Related to Availability 22 39 61
Original RMC RA overestimates risk level 1 2 3
Original RMC RA underestimates risk level 5 13 18
Differences caused by factors not related to the QualTD Model 1 6 7
Differences caused by using the QualTD Model 5 9 14
The first important finding is that the RMC personnel acknowledges that risk estimation in RA2
is more accurate than in RA1 for all the cases. In seven cases, the reason of the difference was
due to external causes that do not involve the use of the QualTD Model. For example, in RA1 the
vulnerabilities regarding the configuration of the Company network were usually underestimated on
purpose. This because the final report of the RA carried out without the model was directed to the
GIT board, who is not directly managing the Company network. Consequently, the judgement of the
RMC team was that it was not useful to point out the obvious in the report, since the RA requester
had no way of managing that kind of risk. The remaining 14 differences are due to a better quality
of RA2.
According to our analysis, the success of RA2 is due to the fact that the QualTD Model enables
the risk assessor to estimate with more precision the consequences of a threat materialising, and also
to determine the impact of the vulnerabilities, by explicitly linking them to the incidents they can
cause: all these operations are hard to perform without an architecture model that allows one to
reason about the availability impact.
Criterion 2: # of hours employed for an RA We split the analysis on time consumption
of the two RAs according to the four steps of the Company RA process supported by the QualTD
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Model.
1. RA intake: the time needed to accomplish this step with the Company method is on average
one week. Building the dependency graph certainly constitutes an overhead, since it requires
to formalise the knowledge acquired from the documentation and it also requires at least one
additional meeting with the developers of the system. In our case, we spent approximately two
weeks to finish the RA intake step using the QualTD Model. About half a week was needed
to gain knowledge of the Company, which would not have been necessary by an experienced
RA team in the Company itself. So we think that an RA team of the RMC department,
experienced as we are, would have needed about 1.5 weeks to build the dependency graph.
Whether this is worth the investment depends on the benefits to be gained from this in terms
of a more accurate RA and in terms of the reusability of this graph for future RAs of this or
other (related) systems.
2. BIA: including the estimation of the service/process criticality into the Business Impact Anal-
ysis is an inexpensive task, since it is already included in the procedure followed by the RMC
personnel, only in an informal way. Moreover, we experienced that it was easy for the GIT to
rank the services by criticality, since this knowledge is part of their everyday business. Formal-
ising service/process criticality took less than a person-hour.
3. TVA: differently to the Company method, the QualTD Model explicitly requires to link threats
and vulnerabilities to the nodes of the dependency graph to evaluate the risk. This task took
us approximately four days more than the time normally employed by the RMC personnel.
However, this is partly due to the fact that we had to “learn” and get used to the definitions of
the threats and vulnerabilities of the list provided by the Company. We estimate that, should
we have known them better we would have done the same job in half the time. Moreover,
another good part of the work was that of manually linking threats and vulnerabilities to
nodes; we did this step by hand and it was very time consuming: a proper GUI would have
saved us other time.
4. Risk prioritisation: using the QualTD Model does facilitate this step. In fact, following the
Company RA process, the RA team has to perform a (time-expensive) peer review of the risk
evaluation performed by each member of the team, i.e., the team members have to go through
their personal estimation of likelihood and impact for each threat/vulnerability and, in case they
find any discrepancy, determine the reasons motivating each decision and reach a final agreement
on the proper likelihood/impact levels. The QualTD Model is able to automatically prioritise
threats and vulnerabilities, and therefore it makes it easier the prioritisation task. Moreover,
as risks are evaluated in a more detailed level (i.e., incidents instead of threats/vulnerabilities),
the QualTD Model facilitates the discussion on the final impact level of threats/vulnerabilities.
For example, during the discussion with the RMC personnel on the outcomes of RA2, we used
the model to explain why a certain threat or vulnerability had a certain risk level by going into
detail on the incidents that these threats and vulnerability are involved in. This technique was
judged very useful and practical by the RMC personnel. It is also possible to re-use most of the
work of linking threats, nodes and vulnerabilities for future RAs on the same ToA, this would
reduce to zero the difference with the original method in the time consumption on the TVA
step.
Criterion 3: # of subjective decisions taken in an RA Reducing the subjectivity of
the RA approach is one of the original goals of the RMC department, which aims at (a) delivering
better quality results by identifying as many potential and relevant risks as possible, and (b) being
able to justify the reasons why a certain threat or vulnerability was given a certain risk level.
The QualTD Model supports the first objective by “forcing” the risk assessor to systematically
explore all the possible combinations of threats and vulnerabilities, thus reducing the risk of mis-
estimating the importance of a certain threat or vulnerability.
Regarding the second objective, since the QualTD Model requires to explicitly enumerate avail-
ability incidents, it is easier for the risk assessor to trace back the reasons why a threat/vulnerability
was assigned a certain risk level. Moreover, a member of the RMC department has to give (explicitly
or implicitly) four subjective estimates to evaluate a single incident: the likelihood of the threat,
the likelihood that the vulnerability is present in some nodes, the duration of the incident and the
criticality of the services/processes it hits. By applying the QualTD Model, the global impact of an
incident is based on the criticality of the nodes involved, which is given by the RA requester. In this
way we are reducing by one fourth the number of estimates to be done by the RMC personnel for
each incident. As we mentioned before, the Company aknowledges that applying the QualTD Model
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resulted in an increase on the accuracy of risk level evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities. We
think that this is also due to the fact that the QualTD Model reduces the subjectivity of the impact
estimates.
Criterion 4: Cost of risk management The budget for managing risks, as for everything
else in the real world, is always limited. Even with an unbounded budget, it is not possible to achieve
100% security, and this is even more true when the budget is finite. In this perspective, optimising the
costs of risk management means achieving at least the same security level at a lower price. To achieve
this goal it is important to adequately prioritise the risks one wants to manage in terms of: (a) the
risk level and, (b) the cost to mitigate that risk. By providing a more precise risk prioritisation based
on (a), the QualTD Model supports part of the decision process of prioritising risks for mitigation
purposes. At present time however, the model does not include any means of prioritising risks
w.r.t. (b). Actually, our model bears similarities with the quantitative TD Model [27] which, on the
other hand, does include countermeasures and enables one to run an optimisation algorithm which
select the best risk mitigation strategy taking into account (a) and (b). We believe that the same
approach is applicable also to the QualTD Model with few modifications. This is however beyond
the scope of this paper, and left as future work.
6.1 Evaluation of the QualTD Model under an IT-Management per-
spective
Organisations are used to run their IT processes following guidelines provided in specific IT gover-
nance standards, among which CobiT [31] is a de facto standard.
To benchmark the implementation of the IT governance control processes it suggests, CobiT
provides the so-called maturity models (derived from the Software Engineering Institutes Capability
Maturity Model [21]), by which one can measure the present state of the organisation, decide a
target goal and evaluate progress towards that goal. The maturity model CobiT provides for the risk
management process is mainly focused on organisational aspects, such as embedding risk management
in the organisation decision process. Under this perspective, the adoption of the QualTD Model
would provide little or no benefit.
However, recently ISACA released a new framework, RiskIT [39], which is based on CobiT but
is specific for risk management. RiskIT provides a maturity model to evaluate the risk evaluation
process adopted by organisations, which consists of five levels, from non-existent (i.e., when the
organisation cannot understand how IT risks affect its performance), to optimised (i.e., when risk
evaluation is completely embedded at all levels of the organisation, sources of information are fully
available and formal methods and supporting tools are systematically used).
A crucial difference from a level 2 (Repeatable) to a level 3 (Defined) risk evaluation, is to use
systematic dependency analysis to determine the business impact of the possible risk factors. Since
systematical dependency analysis is one of the main features of the QualTD model, we believe that
an organisation which aims at establishing a risk evaluation process with maturity level greater than
2 may adopt our model to satisfy this requirement.
Also, one of the requirements to establish a level 4 (Managed) risk evaluation process is to use
risk analysis tools, possibly integrated with other tools from which they can gather information or
deliver results. Due to its formalised and systematical nature, the QualTD Model is designed to be
implementable in an RA supporting tool, which is what we partly did to support the Oxygen RA. Our
tool can be integrated with IT enterprise architecture tools (e.g., TOGAF [40] or ArchiMate [29]),
as well as configuration management tools to efficiently build the dependency graph, as we show in
our previous work [27].
7 Generalising to other scenarios
Based on the experience of the case-study, we observe that there are two main factors which deter-
mined the success of the QualTD Model.
First, the model forces the RA team to follow a systematic approach, this means that there is less
space for human errors and that the model provides an affordable way to deal with the complexity
of the ToA. The QualTD Model shares this characteristic with many other model-based approaches,
as for example model checking techniques. This also means that, as other model-based approaches,
it requires a preliminary investment in terms of time and resource to build the model. With this
case-study we showed that the time investment does not exceed 50% of the time spent in an RA
carried out without the model, and the resources commonly available for an RA are sufficient to
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build the model. In general, this investment can be very worthwhile (because e.g. it allows one to
reuse the information gathered or it allows one to identify problems that would remain undetected
with other techniques), or just a waste of resources. In our case, as confirmed by the RMC team,
a QualTD Model built for an RA can be widely re-used in the following RAs of the same ToA; the
resource investment can be compensated by reusing the model in successive RAs. This makes it
particularly suitable for the cases in which the ToA is periodically subject to RAs. More in general,
our model-based risk assessment approach, should only be used when it either allows one to save
resources in the long run (as explained above) or when the need for accurate results is worth the effort
of using it. In the case analyzed here, Oxygen is an availability-critical system for the Company, and
therefore the need for accuracy in the assessment justified the time overhead it introduced. Also, the
need to optimise the budget for risk mitigation could be a leading factor for choosing the QualTD
Model and afford its initial time overhead. Another scenario in which using the QualTD Model could
be convenient is when the dependency graph can be built automatically (e.g., when a configuration
management database is already present and can be used to build the graph), since in this case there
is almost no time overhead.
A second success factor of the QualTD Model is that it links the knowledge about security with the
components of an IT architecture, their technical and functional dependencies and their importance.
With this case-study we showed that the QualTD Model structures information in a way that is
simple enough to be used and complete enough to cover all the aspects that are important for a
security RA. In fact, we did not find any uncovered risk area in RA1 which was not covered in RA2.
For this reason, we think that the QualTD Model is particularly suitable to be used to assess the
availability risks of an IT infrastructure or of parts of it.
8 Generalising to other methods
In this section we determine if the QualTD Model can be coupled with other (standard) methods
other than the Company’s one. To do this, we first make a taxonomy of standard RA methods, then
we determine which are the characteristics of those methods which are compatible with our model.
A taxonomy of RA methods To provide a state-of-the-art picture on RA methodologies we
follow the survey from ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) [35]. The
survey consists of a list of sixteen RA methods currently in use. Among these methods we only
consider international standards, i.e., those which are available in English and which are actually
in use in more than one country. According to these criteria, we reduce the initial list of sixteen
methods to ten: CRAMM [32], EBIOS [34], ISAMM [33], ISO 13335-2 [13], ISO 17799 (now ISO
27002) [17], ISO 27001 [16], IT-Grundshuts [36], MEHARI [37], OCTAVE [28], NIST SP 800-30 [24].
The remaining six methods are dropped because of two reasons: Austrian IT Security Handbook,
Dutch A&K Analysis and MARION because only available in a single language (German or Dutch),
while ISF, MAGERIT and MIGRA because of lack of relevant documentation. Finally, since the
list on the ENISA survey is not admittedly complete, we integrate it with another popular method,
the Australian/New Zeland standard for risk management AS/NZS4360 [30], and with CORAS [7],
the method resulting from the EU-funded project IST-2000-25031. We explicitly choose to exclude
Common Criteria [14] from this list as it is not properly an RA method, even if it requires some risk
analysis to be performed.
Table 5: Classification of the RA methods.
Methodology Evaluation scale Impact evaluation Risk evaluation
CRAMM Qualitative Based on open damage scenarios Type 1
EBIOS Qualitative Based on security needs Type 2
ISAMM Quantitative Based on monetary loss Type 3
ISO 13335-2 Both Based on the business harm N/A
ISO 17799 Qualitative Based on the business harm N/A
ISO 27001 Qualitative N/A N/A
IT-Grundschutz Qualitative Based on open damage scenarios Type 5
MEHARI Qualitative Based on fixed damage scenarios Type 1
OCTAVE Qualitative Based on critical assets Type 4
NIST SP 800-30 Qualitative Based on open damage scenarios Type 1
AS/NZS 4360 Both
Based on a balance between business
harm and business advantages
Type 5
CORAS Both Based on open damage scenarios Type 5
For the sake of presentation, we classify the twelve methods by means of three parameters: (1)
the scale used to evaluate risk and risk factors (quantitative or qualitative), (2) which factors the
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method proposes to evaluate the impact level and (3) the underlying view on how risk is evaluated.
Parameter (1) determines if the risk level measures a something that can be (meaningfully)
expressed in numbers (e.g., money), or something which can only be expressed with labels (e.g.,
high, medium, low). In other words, a qualitative method measures the level of a risk factor in an
ordinal scale (i.e., only ordering among values are known), while a quantitative method uses measures
in interval or ratio scales (i.e., it is known the magnitude of the difference between two values, ratio
scales also define an absolute and non arbitrary zero point).
Parameter (2) indicates which factors the method proposes to influence the impact of a security
event (i.e., a threat, a vulnerability or an incident), and to which extent the method is constrained by
these factors. Some methodologies only give general guidelines (e.g., the damage to the organisation),
while others strictly define a particular set of parameters (e.g., the money loss, or the affected business
processes).
Parameter (3) investigates what determines the risk level of a security event and how different
properties are combined. To this end we elaborated five different profiles (Type 1 to Type 5):
1. Type 1:
Risk(Threat, Asset) = Likelihood(Threat)⊗V ulnerability(Threat, Asset)⊗Impact(Threat, Asset)
Risk is analysed w.r.t. a threat and an asset, or a group of assets and it is evaluated as the
combination of the likelihood of the threat, the vulnerability level of the asset(s) to the threat
and the impact of the threat on the asset(s). This approach can be applied both to fine-grained
assessments (i.e., taking into account single assets and asset-specific threats) and to more high-
level assessments (i.e., taking into account only classes of assets and high level threats).
2. Type 2:
Risk(Threat, Asset,Needs) = Impact(Threat,Needs)⊗ V ulnerability(Threat, Asset)
Risk is analysed w.r.t. a threat, an asset and some security needs on the system and it is
evaluated as the combination of the vulnerability of the asset and the impact of the threat on
the security needs. This approach is suitable where security requirements are clearly specified,
for example for software products developed by following a rigourous software engineering
process.
3. Type 3:
Risk(Threat, Asset) = AnnualLossExpectancy(Threat, Asset) =
Probability(Threat, Asset)⊗AverageLoss(Threat, Asset)
Risk is analysed w.r.t a threat and an asset, is intended as the annual loss expectancy (in
monetary terms) and it is evaluated as the combination of the probability of the threat affecting
the asset and the average loss of the resulting incident. This approach is suitable in all the
situations in which decisions are taken based on a financial cost/benefit analysis (e.g., insurance
companies), and in which quantitative data is available (e.g., for critical infrastructures).
4. Type 4:
Risk(Threat, CriticalAsset) = Impact(Threat, CriticalAsset)⊗V ulnerability(CriticalAsset)
Risk is analysed w.r.t. a threat and an asset that has previously been identified as critical, and
it is assessed as the combination of the impact of the threat on the critical asset and the vul-
nerability of the asset. This approach is suitable where there are critical assets to be protected
(e.g., for utility network infrastructures).
5. Type 5:
Risk(Incident, Asset) = Likelihood(Incident)⊗ Consequences(Incident, Asset)
Risk is analysed w.r.t. and incident (i.e., a combination of a threat and some vulnerabilities)
and an asset, and it is evaluated as the combination of the likelihood of the incident and the
consequences of the incident itself. Unlike for the Type 1 approach, this approach attributes
risk levels only to security incidents (i.e., a threat exploiting a vulnerability) to assess their
risk. This means that it is more suitable to be applied to fine-grained RAs and it is harder to
apply to the high-level ones.
Table 5 depicts the results of the classification. Most of the methodologies are meant to be used
with qualitative measurements, and this confirms the fact that most RAs today are carried out in a
qualitative way, mainly due to lack of reliable quantitative data or to time constraints [3].
Regarding impact level evaluation, we observe that ISO 13335-2 and ISO 17799 are completely
open to the impact level evaluation process, they only specify that the impact of a security event is
tied to the business harm suffered from the organisation. Furthermore, AS/NZS 4360 also specify the
possibility of a business advantage of undertaking a certain risk, e.g., leaving servers un-patched may
lead to a quicker time to market for the organisation. CRAMM, IT-Grundshuts, NIST SP 800-30
21
and CORAS specify more precisely how the impact level should be assessed, since they introduce
the concept of damage scenarios: the RA team should identify different impact scenarios (e.g.,
from Catastrophic to Marginal) which describe the negative consequences of a risk event on the
organisation. We say that these scenarios are “open” as these methods do not specify a particular
set of scenarios or they do not require to use the ones they propose. On the other hand, MEHARI
is based on a “fixed” impact scenario, i.e., the description of the consequences is fixed, and the risk
assessor can only rank them. EBIOS imposes that the impact level of a security event is assessed in
terms of which security needs (i.e., a security requirement on the IT assets) the event is violating.
Similarly, in OCTAVE the impact level is measured in terms of how “hard” the security event is
hitting a mission-critical asset (e.g., a server which has been pre-determied to be critical for the
organisation). Finally, ISAMM measures impact by means of the money the organisation can loose
because of a security event.
Regarding risk level evaluation, we observe that CRAMM (which mostly implements the principles
given in BS7799-3 [5]), MEHARI and NIST SP 800-30 share the same common view on risk, i.e.,
they all consider risk as a combination of the likelihood and the impact of a threat to hit a (group of)
assets and the vulnerability level of this (group of) assets. Similarly, IT-Grundshuts, AS/NZS 4360
and CORAS consider risk as the combination of the likelihood of an incident (i.e., a threat exploiting
some vulnerabilities) and the consequences (positive or negative) of this incident happening. On the
other hand, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 profiles are intrinsically tied to a particular approach to RA,
since Type 2 and Type 4 rely on qualitative concepts for defining risk (e.g., critical assets, security
needs) and Type 3 relies on the quantitative concepts of probability and average monetary loss.
Finally, we observe that the methods of the ISO family do not adopt any risk analysis profile. This
is due to the fact that, according to ENISA [35], ISO 13335-2 is a very general guideline to set up
a risk management framework, while ISO 17799 and ISO 27001 are not properly methods for risk
management, but rather compliance standards, reporting a list of controls for good security practices
and the requisites that an existing method should have to be standard-compliant respectively.
Generalisation According to our method classification scheme, the original RA method followed
by the Company is qualitative, based on the business harm and Type 1 concerning risk level evalua-
tion. The new RA method which integrates the QualTD Model remains qualitative, but it is based
on open damage scenarios and has a basic risk level evaluation of Type 5. We also define a procedure
to translate the evaluation of incident risks to threat and vulnerability risks, making the evaluation
scheme compliant to the original Type 1.
From the perspective of the risk level scale, the QualTD Model can only be used together to a
qualitative RA method; we proposed in [27] the TD Model which can only be used with quantitative
ones.
From the perspective of impact level determination, we showed in the present case how the
QualTD Model can be used together with methods evaluating the impact in terms of business harm.
On the other hand, for methods adopting damage scenarios, the integration with our model is only
possible if the scenario descriptions used by the organisation undertaking the RA can be associated
with the unavailability of a node in the dependency graph. For example, if the scenario description
refers to the e-mail service being unavailable, then we can associate this scenario to the unavailability
of all the IT components on which the e-mail service relies upon, by means of the dependency graph.
For methods in which the impact level is based on critical assets, e.g., OCTAVE, the QualTD Model
cannot be applied as it is, since in the current specification we do not give a definition of critical assets.
However, one possible way of adapting the model to this purpose consists in first determining the
most critical processes/services and then using the dependency graph to find the nodes supporting
those processes/services.
Furthermore, we observe that it is hard to integrate the QualTD Model with methods based on
security needs, such as EBIOS. Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu [12] introduced an approach, which
shares some similarities with ours, and is suitable to be used in combination with these methods: we
will discuss it in more detail in Section 9.
Finally, in the present specification of the model, we do not consider the business advantage of a
certain risky factor, as required by AS/NZS 4360: this is the only obstacle we see for the integration
of the QualTD Model with this standard.
Regarding risk level evaluation, the QualTD Model can be integrated with any method adopting
the Type 5 approach. For example, our model could be used in combination with CORAS as an
additional, availability-specific, technique to determine the consequences of threats, in substitution
of the traditional HazOp, FTA and FMECA techniques.
We showed in the present case how we integrated the QualTD Model with a Type 1 method by means
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of a threat and vulnerability risk level definition table. We believe that this approach is applicable
in general if it is time and information-wise feasible for the risk assessor to explicitly enumerate the
vulnerabilities are present in the ToA.
Integration with a Type 4 is instead more challenging, as it would require an approach similar to the
one we described previously for OCTAVE.
Finally, RAs following Type 2 and Type 3 methods cannot be integrated with our model, due to the
fact that Type 2 methods already (implicitly) take into consideration the consequences of incident
propagation in the definition of the security needs for each asset in the ToA, while Type 3 methods
are quantitative.
9 Related work
Academic researchers have started lately to use dependencies in security RAs to improve their qual-
ity. They have addressed this topic from multiple perspectives, such as information security, business
administration and software engineering. The background of researchers, together with the context
in which the technique is applied leads them to use different type of dependencies. In the literature
we find three kinds of dependencies: security dependencies, software dependencies and organisa-
tional and technical/functional dependencies. In this section we will examine previous literature on
these three fields which matches our work. Moreover, since our method considers the third kind of
dependencies, in the final part of this section we also enumerate some techniques to build techni-
cal/functional dependency graphs.
Security dependencies Baiardi et al. [2] propose a framework for RA of information infrastruc-
tures by building a hyper-graph of security dependencies, i.e., dependencies on the security properties
of the system: confidentiality, integrity and availability. The dependency graph is a form of attack
graph in which nodes are the components of the infrastructure, and edges between nodes represent
the dependency of a component on some security properties of the component it is linked to. Threats
are represented as users of the infrastructures possessing some security properties on some contents,
while vulnerabilities are conditions allowing the extension of security rights from one component to
another. The framework allows one to rank countermeasures and create risk mitigation plans. A
countermeasure can reduce the vulnerability level of a component, update dependencies, update the
initial properties of a threat or increase the resources needed for an attack.
Attack graph-based approaches are known to have scalability problems (e.g., see Lippmann et
al. [20]) in terms of the number of hosts under assessment. This is due to the fact that building
such graphs requires a large amount of work which can be only partially automated. Moreover, they
require extensive and difficult to obtain attack details: we doubt that such an information would
have been readily available in the Oxygen RA.
Software dependencies Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [9] present a semi-quantitative approach
for assessing reliability and availability related risks at early phases of a software life cycle by using
the UML representation of the ToA. In this work, the authors use dependencies between software
components to assess the likelihood of a fault propagating from a component to the other. In more
detail, they use the following UML constructs: software architecture diagrams, use case diagrams,
sequence diagrams and state charts of software components. By means of this information, they
estimate the probability of failure of a software component, and the probability of failure of two
software components interacting with each others. They consider the complexity of a software
component in order to calculate its probability of failure, and the number of messages exchanged by
components to determine the probability of an interaction failure. They give the impact of a failure
w.r.t. a qualitative scale from Minor to Catastrophic. Then, they calculate the risk level distribution
of each UML use case scenario by building a Markov model from the scenario sequence diagram.
Finally, they average all the single use case risk distribution to determine the overall system risk.
This approach could not be adapted to our case, since we do not have an UML representation of the
ToA. Moreover, we are interested in assessing risks caused by external sources (e.g., DoS attacks)
and no quantitative figures about the likelihood of such events were available.
Organisational and technical/functional dependencies Innerhofer-Oberperfler and Breu [12]
propose a model-driven approach for assessing IT-related risks using an enterprise architecture as
the basis of the model. They group entities of the enterprise architecture in four hierarchical layers:
business, application, technical and physical layer. They derive – by refinement – business security
objectives and requirements from this enterprise architecture and from the dependencies among its
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constituents. The refinement process follows a top-down approach starting from high-level business
units to technical and physical devices. Then, they identify and analyse risks to the security re-
quirements by selecting threats and vulnerabilities from standard security methodologies, e.g., BSI
IT-Grundshuts [36]. Once risks are identified, they do a bottom-up aggregation of risk scenarios to
make sure risks become clearly understandable at each level of the organisation (i.e., from technical
to business levels). The approach is qualitative and not linked to a specific threat-list, with a risk
analysis technique very similar to the one presented in the EBIOS [34] method. The strong point of
this approach is that RA is fully embedded on the organisation at all levels, from the technical level to
the business management level. Our case focuses on a single IT system, involving a few departments
of the Company: we have little information regarding the high-level goals of the organisation and the
main difficulty in applying this method would be that of deriving a full list of security requirements
from high level goals.
Kim et al. [19] propose a model to assess and prioritise security risks and their treatment in the
context of a communication infrastructure. They do this by determining the magnitude of damages
produced by a threat to the assets of the ToA, also taking into account incident propagation. To
model incident propagation they use technical and functional dependencies among the assets of
the communication infrastructure: for each threat they create a workflow (graph) of the incident
propagation, with the assets as nodes and the relevant dependencies as edges. They annotate each
edge with the probability that the destination node is affected by the damage on the source node.
Finally, they model the vulnerability level of an asset by considering the “age” of the asset. Starting
from the assumption that systems ages over time, and because of the increased level of knowledge
attackers gain on the weaknesses of the asset, attacks are supposed to have a greater probability
of success over time if the system is not timely patched. Using incident propagation graphs and
likelihood distribution functions, the authors are able to calculate the risk of an infrastructure over
time, and to prioritise the actions to be taken to control those risks. The data available in our case
is insufficient to estimate the level of weakness of the system over time; moreover, according to the
SLAs with the outsourcing company, patching is performed quite regularly on Oxygen: therefore the
weakness (vulnerability) level of the assets is almost constant.
Building a dependency graph Every method using dependencies for RA is based on the
possibility of constructing a dependency graph describing the ToA. Building the dependency graph
is an“extra” step which is not required by traditional RA methodologies, which probably rely on the
same knowledge of the ToA, but in an implicit form. For this reason, building the dependency graph
in a time-effective way is essential for the applicability of dependency-based RAs.
A technical/functional dependency graph can be built either manually or automatically. Manual
methods involve acquiring information by functional and technical documentation and from inter-
views, like we did in the Oxygen RA. On the other hand, Static Dependency Analysis [18] and Active
Dependency Discovery [4] are two automatic techniques to automatically create the graph.
The former method is based on using application configuration files to derive dependencies, e.g.,
the web.xml file for Java web applications. The main drawback of this method is that it does not
generate a full, cross-domain dependency graph. This is due to the fact that some dependencies are
never derivable from a configuration file, and to the high number of different formats configuration
files can take.
The latter method consists of measuring the variation of certain QoS parameters (e.g., availability
or response time) of the ToA after some of its components are deliberately perturbed. For example,
by simulating a network traffic overload it is possible to measure the dependency of the response time
of a software component w.r.t. the network service it relies on. The limitation of this approach is
twofold: first it is invasive for the system, since it requires to modify the system itself or its context,
secondly it is labour intensive, since it requires to test all the possible perturbations to be sure that
all the dependencies are captured.
An example of an Active Dependency Discovery technique was proposed by Bagchi et al. [1] for the
availability of e-commerce environments. The authors propose to inject faults on the test/benchmark
environment of the ToA and detect availability dependencies; the same dependencies are then as-
sumed to hold also on the production system. This technique allows one to quickly build a dependency
graph without the need to know perfectly the implementation details of the ToA. However, to build
a reliable dependency graph, the test/benchmark system must be identical to the production system,
which is not the case for Oxygen.
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10 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce the new QualTD Model and method for the qualitative assessment of
availability risks based on the propagation of availability incidents in an IT architecture. We apply the
model and method to a real-world case by performing an RA on the authentication and authorisation
system of a large multinational company. We compare the results of this RA with the ones obtained
from a previous RA carried out internally by the company on the same system. We then evaluate
the results w.r.t. the goals of the stakeholders of the system.
Our results show the feasibility of the QualTD Model and method, and indicate that the model
provides better results in terms of accuracy and reduces the number of subjective decisions taken by
the risk assessor. The reasons of success are mainly due to the systematic nature of the approach
and to the completeness of the information the model includes. These factors help the risk assessor
to deal with the complexity of the ToA in such a way that no relevant risk factor is neglected. Our
analysis also shows that the QualTD Model is particularly suitable to assess the availability risks
of IT infrastructures or parts of them, when RAs are carried out regularly on the same target and
when the outcomes of the RA are used to prioritise the risk mitigation strategies.
In addition, we analyse 12 risk assessment standard methods, and we discuss which characteristics
of the standard methods are compatible with the QualTD model. Our analysis shows that the
QualTD Model can be used in combination with many of the most popular RA standard methods,
which indicates a wide range of applicability of the method, also in organisations not using the same
RA method we used in this case.
Finally, we make a review of academic works we found in the literature which apply dependency
analysis to RA. We show the type of risk analysis these methods allow to do and we discuss their
applicability to our real-world case. Out analysis shows that none of the methods examined are
directly applicable to our case either because they require information that was not readily available,
or because they cannot satisfy the requirements of the stakeholders.
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